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Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? 
Disentangling Incentives from Selection
* 
 
The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for an elective office and 
the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics 
because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians’ pay may 
change their mind. Second, if the reelection prospects of incumbents depend on their in-
office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal 
governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi-experimental 
framework. In Italy, the wage of the mayor depends on population size and sharply rises at 
different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that 
uniquely identifies a wage increase – 5,000 inhabitants – to control for unobservable town 
characteristics. Exploiting the existence of a two-term limit, we further disentangle the 
composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our 
results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates, and that better paid 
politicians size down the government machinery by improving internal efficiency. Importantly, 
most of this performance effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than 
by the incentive to be reelected. 
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Paying politiciansis a debated but elusivetopic. Firms set the wage of workers to maximize
their proﬁts; politicians set the wage of bureaucrats to maximize either social welfare or
their own interests. For the same reason, citizens—the principal—should set the optimal
compensation of politicians—the agent—according to some welfare criteria. But this is
rarely the case. The wage of elected oﬃcials is decided by politicians themselves. And the
public opinion swings from the complaint against the high salaries of the political elite
to the acknowledgment that “if you pay peanuts you get monkeys” also in politics.1 No
evidence unambiguously supports either claim.
The wage paid to electedoﬃcials is an important element—although not the only one—
in shaping both the decision to enter politics and the behavior once in oﬃce. According
to the standard eﬃciency wage theory, a salary increase could both attract more skilled
candidates (citizens with higher opportunity costs) and enhance performance (because of
the higher cost of not being reelected). Various models in political economics contain
similar intuitions while adding more structure on the political side—see, among others,
Besley (2004) and Caselli and Morelli (2004). Alternative models, instead, build on some
peculiarities of the political sector to show that, if high-skilled citizens have a comparative
advantage in entering politics—for instance, because of higher post-congressional returns,
as in Mattozzi and Merlo (2008)—paying politicians more may have a crowding-out eﬀect
and decrease the average quality. At the end of the day, the question of whether politicians’
remuneration aﬀects their selection and performance remains empirical.
In this paper, we use a dataset on the mayors of all Italian municipalities from 1993
to 2001 to evaluate the impact of politicians’ remuneration in a quasi-experimental frame-
work. In Italy, the wage of the mayor increases with the size of the resident population, the
motivation for this rule being that, as for companies’ executives, the amount of work and
responsibility grows with the number of people to be managed. The quasi-experimental
framework arises because the wage does not increase monotonically, but sharply changes
at nine diﬀerent thresholds. As long as population size cannot be manipulated by the
1Other traditional views emphasize that a better pay might also guarantee a broader representation
of all social categories, and reduce the incentives for corruption. We focus here on competence and
performance, because other measures of politicians’ quality, such as honesty, are not available.
1mayor to sort above these thresholds and be paid more, the institutional setting delivers
a clean exogenous variation in the remuneration of politicians. This is not the case with
other observational setups, which are plagued with sizable selection bias if politicians can
set their own wage, or if environmental characteristics inﬂuence both the salary and the
opportunity cost of entering politics.
Politicians’ pay is not the only policy decided by the number of resident inhabitants,
though. The size of the municipal council, the electoral rule, and many other policies
vary according to population brackets. After inquiring the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs
and comparing diﬀerent legislative sources as a cross-check, we found out that only three
thresholds uniquely identify a wage increase: 1,000, 5,000, and 50,000 inhabitants. How-
ever, we cannot use the 1,000 threshold because of its late introduction (in 2000) and the
50,000 threshold because of sample size limitations. We hence focus on the 5,000 threshold,
at which there is a sharp 33% increase (28% after 2000) in the mayor’s wage. Although the
local eﬀect identiﬁed at this threshold may not be easily generalized to higher population
levels, it should be noted that small cities (below 10,000 inhabitants) account for about
90% of all Italian municipalities. Furthermore, the large executive power of mayors, and
the close monitoring put forth by voters especially in small municipalities, ﬁt well with
Besley’s (2004, p. 210) recommendation that agency models on paying politicians “are
most promising when applied in situations where there are directly elected chief execu-
tives with signiﬁcant discretionary power.” We therefore apply a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD) at the 5,000 threshold to control for unobservable town characteristics and
test whether a higher wage attracts individuals with higher opportunity costs (eﬀect of
the wage on political selection) and improves the performance of elected politicians (eﬀect
of the wage on performance).
As for selection, the empirical results show that the 33% wage increase at 5,000 attracts
more educated candidates: from 0.9 to 1.2 years of schooling more, depending on the
speciﬁcation, which means an increase in education from 6.4% to 8.6% (with respect to an
average of 14 years of schooling in municipalities between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants).
There is also evidence that the wage increase attracts more candidates employed in high-
skilled occupations, such as lawyers, professionals, or entrepreneurs. This translates into
more educated (from 0.9 to 1.6 years of schooling more) and high-skilled elected mayors.
2As for performance, following the literature on political accountability and political
budget cycles, we ﬁrst look at policies of direct interest to voters, such as taxes, tariﬀs,
and expenditures.2 We ﬁnd that better paid politicians reduce the size of the municipal
government. In particular, they lower taxes and tariﬀs per capita (by about 13% and
86%, respectively) and reduce the amount of personnel and other current expenditures
(by about 11% and 22%, respectively).
This performance result can have two diﬀerent interpretations. First, more skilled
politicians are better at making the government machinery more eﬃcient, as they reduce
current—instead of capital—expenditure, characterized by sizable passive waste in Italy
(Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009). Second, the reduction in government size reﬂects
diﬀerences in preferences, with more educated mayors having weaker preferences for re-
distribution and public services (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). We shed more light on
these alternative explanations by looking at two eﬃciency indicators for the management
of the municipal government: the speed of revenues collection (that is, the ratio between
collected and assessed revenues) and the speed of payment (that is, the ratio between paid
and committed outlays). Our results show that better paid mayors eﬀectively increase the
speed of revenues collection by 7%. And this supports the interpretation that they are at
least able to make the bureaucratic organization more eﬃcient.
The eﬀect of the wage on performance might be driven by two distinct components:
better paid politicians may act diﬀerently because of their higher skills (composition eﬀect
of the wage on performance) or because of enhanced reelection motives (incentive eﬀect
of the wage on performance).3 To disentangle these two channels, we exploit another
institutional feature of the Italian legislation: the existence of a two-term limit. It is true,
indeed, that also mayors with a binding term limit have a lot of incentives to perform well,
including the desire to run for higher oﬃces or to leave a positive legacy, but all of these
motivations do not depend on the wage. Therefore, mayors just below and just above
the 5,000 threshold have identical incentives when they all face a binding term limit. On
the contrary, when the term limit is not binding, their incentives diverge because of the
2As empirical tests of political agency models using budget variables, see—among others—Besley and
Case (1995) and List and Sturm (2006). As empirical studies on political budget cycles, see—among
others—Akhmedov and Zhuravskaja (2004) and Brender and Drazen (2008).
3To avoid confusion between terms, we refer to “selection eﬀect” as the impact of the wage on selection,
and to “composition eﬀect” as the selection component of the impact of the wage on performance.
3diﬀerent wage they would obtain if reelected. Following a diﬀ-in-diﬀ strategy, we thus
subtract the diﬀerence between the performance of second-term mayors just above and
below the threshold from the diﬀerence between the performance of ﬁrst-term mayors just
above and below the threshold, to retrieve an estimate of the (reelection) incentive eﬀect
of the wage on performance. Our results show that most of the performance eﬀect is
driven by the higher competence of the elected mayors, rather than by the incentive to be
reelected. We take this as evidence of the strength of the composition eﬀect. Alternative
explanations for the lack of a (reelection) incentive eﬀect, including strong ideological
preferences by voters, do not receive support from the data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set the theoretical background and
review the related literature. In Section 3, we formalize our econometric strategy. In
Section 4, we describe the institutional framework and the data. In Section 5, we present
the estimation results and a number of robustness exercises. We conclude with Section 6.
2 Related literature
2.1 Theoretical background
According to the eﬃciency wage theory, workers’ productivity is increasing in the real wage
they are paid.4 There are three main explanations for why this relationship should hold:
paying workers more reduces shirking because of the higher cost of being ﬁred (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984); it enhances the quality of applicants (Weiss, 1980); and it improves
motivation and group work norms (Akerlof, 1982). If we apply these insights to the labor
market for politicians, we should conclude that a higher wage is likely to improve the
performance of elected oﬃcials due to diﬀerent reasons. First, a higher wage will attract
more skilled individuals (that is, citizens with better outside opportunities in the private
sector) into politics. Second, it will increase the incumbent’s payoﬀ from being reelected;
and this, in turn, will make elected oﬃcials more disciplined (e.g., less inclined to extract
rents). Third, it could improve the morale of politicians.
The eﬃciency wage theory, of course, does not consider many aspects that are speciﬁc
to the political arena, such as party selection, campaigning, non-monetary incentives, and
4See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) or Yellen (1984) for a survey of the eﬃciency wage literature.
4voters’ preferences. Various models in political economics, however, contain some intu-
itions and predictions of the eﬃciency wage theory while providing speciﬁc insights on the
political side. Besley (2004) builds an agency model with both unobserved heterogeneity in
the congruence of politicians with voters (adverse selection) and unobserved action when
in oﬃce (moral hazard). As reelection is the main incentive mechanism, a higher wage
plays a discipline role, that is, it increases performance by forcing dissonant politicians
to extract lower rents. Moreover, a higher wage also increases the fraction of congruent
politicians, who—unlike the dissonant type—earn no rents from entering politics. Caselli
and Morelli (2004) present an adverse selection model where low-quality citizens (“bad
politicians”) have a comparative advantage in holding oﬃce, because their market wages
are lower than those of more competent individuals, or because they extract more rents
than more honest individuals. In this framework, a higher salary raises the average quality
of the (self-selected) pool of politicians. Persson and Tabellini (2000) propose a career-
concern model where forward-looking voters use past performance to estimate the ability
of the incumbent. As a result, also low-ability oﬃcials have an incentive to cut rents and
increase the political output in order to be reelected. In this framework, the higher the
wage, the lower politicians’ rents and the higher performance.
The prediction that the quality of politicians is increasing in their wage, however, is
not unanimously shared by the literature. Actually, a number of models suggest that the
opposite may be true in all the circumstances in which high-quality citizens have other
incentivesto enter politics, because a higher remuneration has the indirect eﬀect of making
all the other (low-quality) candidates more willing to run.5 For example, Mattozzi and
Merlo (2008) propose a dynamic model where there are both “career politicians,” who stay
in politics until retirement, and individuals with “political careers,” who stay in politics for
a while in order to signal their true ability to the private sector. In this framework, a wage
increase lowers the average quality of citizens who have political careers, because politics
becomes a relatively more attractive option for all levels of skills, and it has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the average quality of career politicians, because also high-ability incumbents
are more willing to remain in politics. Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008)
5Messner and Polborn (2004) come to a similar conclusion, although in their case the rationale is that
competent candidates have an higher incentive to free-ride on mediocre candidates, under the assumption
that the attractiveness of public life is low.
5study the eﬀect of outside income on political selection: if politicians can keep their
private business while appointed and election boosts the private returns of high-ability
citizens, then outside income can induce equilibria with positive sorting, where a wage
increase would make the public oﬃce relatively more attractive for low-ability citizens.
Finally, Besley (2005) introduces another explanation of the negative impact of the wage
on politicians’ quality: if public service motivations are strong, a higher remuneration
lowers the relative attractiveness of politics for public-spirited individuals.
2.2 Empirical studies
Despite this rich set of theoretical predictions, there are only a few empirical studies on the
impact of politicians’ remuneration. Di Tella and Fisman (2004) look at gubernatorial pay
in the US from 1950 to 1990 and ﬁnd that wages respond to changes in state income and
taxes per capita. In particular, governors obtain a one percent pay cut for each ten percent
increase in per capita taxation, and there is some evidence that this negative tax elasticity
is an implicit form of performance pay. Besley (2004) analyzes the same data on US
gubernatorial pay. He ﬁnds that the congruence between the ideological positions of the
governor and citizens—as measured by established surveys—is positively associated with
the governor’s wage. Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) estimate a structural dynamic
model of congressional careers in the US, ﬁnding that congressional experience signiﬁcantly
increases post-congressional wages in the private sector. Keane and Merlo (2007) use the
same model to evaluate the eﬀect of reducing the relative wage of congressmen. They ﬁnd
that a wage reduction would induce more skilled politicians to exit Congress (where skills
refer to the ability to win elections), but this is not true for “achievers,” that is, for those
who perform better in terms of legislative and policy goals.
An empirical exercise similar to ours was presented, independently, by Ferraz and
Finan (2009). To the best of our knowledge, this is the only other paper that builds
on a clean exogenous variation in the pay of elected oﬃcials. They implement an RDD
exploiting a Brazilian constitutional amendment that introduced caps on the wages of
municipal councillors (vereadores) according to population size. They show that a higher
wage attracts more candidates and, in particular, more educated ones; they also ﬁnd
that legislative productivity—measured as the number of bills submitted and approved—
6increases with the salary. Despite the similarity between the two approaches, however,
our paper is distinct in many respects. First, we implement a sharp (instead of a fuzzy)
RDD, because in Italy it is the statutory wage that varies with population size. Second,
we focus on the mayor as the chief executive of the municipality, and then we look at
budget indicators as performance outcomes. Third—and most important—we disentangle
between the composition and the incentive eﬀect of the wage on performance, exploiting
the existence of a two-term limit.
To a lower extent, our paper also relates to other strands of the political economics
literature. Recent studies have implemented RDD exercises based on policies that vary
with population size at the local level, in order to estimate the eﬀect of the number of
legislators on the size of government (Petterson-Lindbom, 2008), the eﬀect of the electoral
rule on economic policy (Bordignon and Tabellini, 2008; Chamon et al., 2008), the eﬀect
of ﬁscal windfalls on corruption and political selection (Brollo et al., 2009), or the eﬀect
of direct versus representative democracy (Petterson-Lindbom and Tyrefors, 2009). Our
results could also be compared with the studies on the eﬀect of civil servants’ pay on
corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), although we
look at elected oﬃcials and focus on administrative IQ rather than honesty. Finally, as we
make the assumption that a binding term limit wipes out reelection incentives, we borrow
insights from the vast literature on political accountability and term limits.6
3 Econometric framework
3.1 Identifying the eﬀect of the wage
In this section, we formalize the evaluation framework that allows us to identify the eﬀect
of the wage on both the selection and the in-oﬃce performance of politicians. In particular,
we want to test the following hypotheses.
(H1) A higher wage attracts more citizens with high opportunity costs into politics, that
is, more skilled individuals with high alternative remunerations in the private sector
(eﬀect of the wage on political selection).
6See—among others—Rogoﬀ (1990), Besley and Case (1995), Maskin and Tirole (2004), List and
Sturm (2006), Smart and Sturm (2006), and Ferraz and Finan (2007).
7(H2) A higher wage enhances the performance of elected oﬃcials (eﬀect of the wage on
performance). This may in turn be determined by two channels:
(H2.1) a higher wage attracts more skilled citizens into politics (composition eﬀect);
(H2.2) a higher wage increases the cost of not being reelected (incentive eﬀect).
A major empirical diﬃculty in identifying the eﬀect of politicians’ remuneration on
their selection and performance is the absence of a truly exogenous variation in the amount
they are paid. It is not hard to imagine rent-seeking politicians raising their own salary,
or righteous representatives giving up part of their remuneration to prove their public-
spiritedness. For the same reason, in the absence of an exogenous rule, one might also
expect the social environment (e.g., the level of economic development, social capital, or
corruption) to determine both politicians’ wage and characteristics. To overcome these
endogeneity problems, we exploit the Italian policy of paying mayors according to the
population size of the municipality.
Deﬁne Xi as the characteristics of citizens who run for mayor in town i; Yi as some
performance indicator; Pi as the population size; and Wi as the wage paid to the mayor.
By law, the wage sharply increases at the population threshold Pc. That is, if Pi ≥ Pc,
then Wi = Wh; if Pi < Pc, then Wi = W` < Wh. To formalize the idea that both the
characteristics of politicians and the performance of the mayor depend on the wage, we use
a potential outcome framework. Deﬁne Xi(Wk) ≡ Xik, with k ∈ {`,h}, as the potential
characteristics of politicians in town i if the wage is equal to Wk. Similarly, Yi(Wk) ≡ Yik,
with k ∈ {`,h}, captures the potential performance of the mayor in town i if the wage is
equal to Wk. In the following, we omit the subscript i, for all variables are town-speciﬁc.
For each town, we either observe X` and Y` or Xh and Yh, according to the wage of the
mayor. The estimand of interest is the average treatment eﬀect for the entire population
or for a subpopulation of cities (Ω): E[Xh − X`|i ∈ Ω] and E[Yh − Y`|i ∈ Ω]. The
conditional comparison of X and Y in towns with W = W` against towns with W = Wh
does not generally provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment eﬀect, because
towns with diﬀerent unobservable characteristics may endogenously choose the mayor’s
remuneration, as discussed above. The fact that in Italy the salary of mayors depends on
the population size, however, can be exploited to implement a sharp RDD and estimate
8the causal eﬀect of the wage on both X and Y . In order to do this, we need to make the
following assumptions.7
Assumption 1 E[X`|P = p] and E[Xh|P = p] are continuous in p at Pc.
Assumption 2 E[Y`|P = p] and E[Yh|P = p] are continuous in p at Pc.
In other words, the potential characteristics of the political elite and the potential
performance of the mayor, which may depend on the population size P, should not display
any discontinuityat Pc. Although both assumptions are more than plausible in our setting,
two caveats are in order. First, if mayors can manipulate population size and sort above
the threshold, treatment assignment is no longer exogenous. Second, if there is another
policy that depends on population size and shares the same threshold Pc, the eﬀect of the
wage is confounded with the eﬀect of this other policy and cannot be identiﬁed. It is thus
important to check whether the data provide evidence of sorting around the threshold,
and to be sure that other policies do not vary across the same population threshold.
Under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that E[X`|P = Pc] = limP↑Pc X
and E[Xh|P = Pc] = limP↓Pc X. We can thus identify the treatment eﬀect of the wage on
political selection as





Similarly, under Assumption 2, the treatment eﬀect of the wage on performance is





Both τsel and τper are deﬁned as local eﬀects, because they capture the impact of the wage
only for towns around the threshold Pc. As usual in RDD, the gain in internal validity
comes at the price of lower external validity.
3.2 Disentangling incentives from selection
To empirically disentangle (H2.1) and (H2.2) as alternative explanations of the impact of
the wage on performance, we need to introduce further notation and assumptions. Using
7See Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) for a discussion of identiﬁcation assumptions in RDD.
9an additive speciﬁcation, as it is typical in a diﬀ-in-diﬀ strategy, we rewrite potential per-
formance in the following form: Yk = S(Xk + vk) + Ik, where the function S(.) captures
the impact of the potential observable characteristics Xk and the unobservable character-
istics vk on performance, and Ik represents the incentive eﬀect associated with the wage
Wk.8 For example, if vh > v`, citizens attracted to politics by Wh have unobservable
skills that improve their performance with respect to citizens attracted to politics by W`.
Based on this formulation, the eﬀect of the wage on performance can be decomposed as
τper = σper + φper, where:
σper ≡ E[S(Xh + vh) − S(X` + v`)|P = Pc],
φper ≡ E[Ih − I`|P = Pc].
To identify these average treatment eﬀects, we exploit an additional feature of the
Italian institutional framework. Because of a term limit, mayors cannot spend more than
two consecutive terms in oﬃce. We can thus introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3 The incentive eﬀect of the wage on performance is at work only when the
term limit is not binding (reelection motive).
Note that this assumption does not mean that mayors in the second term have no
incentives to perform well. They may still want to do their best because they plan to run
for higher oﬃces; because they want to be remembered for their positive legacy; or simply
because of intrinsic motivations. The important point is that all of these incentives do
not depend on the wage, as reelection in the same town no longer belongs to the mayor’s
opportunity set. Whenever the term limit is binding, incentives are therefore identical for
mayors just below or just above Pc. Let TL be an index for the term limit, with TL = 0
when the term limit constraint is slack (that is, the mayor is in the ﬁrst term), and TL = 1
when it is binding (that is, the mayor is in the second term). Potential outcomes now
depend not only on W, but also on TL, that is, Ykj, with j ∈ {0,1}. Under Assumption
3, they can be summarized as follows.
8One mightthink of alternative speciﬁcations of Y , e.g., includingan interaction term between (Xk+vk)
and Ik to capture the diﬀerent outside opportunities of mayors attracted by diﬀerent wage levels. However,
as it will become clear in the rest of this section, we partial out any heterogeneity in the individual outside
option when we compute the diﬀerence of Y over the terms for the same mayor.
10W = W` W = Wh
TL=0 Y`0 = S(X`0 + v`0) + I` Yh0 = S(Xh0 + vh0) + Ih
TL=1 Y`1 = S(X`1 + v`1) + exp Yh1 = S(Xh1 + vh1) + exp
Here, exp stands for administrative experience, which we assume to aﬀect performance
independently of the wage schedule.9 The above table shows that mayors in the ﬁrst
term and mayors in the second term might have diﬀerent skills. In particular, as long as
performance is relevant for reelection, we expect mayors at TL = 1 to be more skilled
according to both observable and unobservable characteristics. In general: S(Xk0+vk0) 6=
S(Xk1 + vk1). If we restrict the analysis to the sample of politicians who are elected for
two consecutive terms, however, we have that: S(Xk0 + vk0) = S(Xk1 + vk1).
In this context, we can identify the overall eﬀect of the wage on performance as:





where the ﬁrst equality follows from Assumption 3 and the sample restriction to politicians
elected for two consecutive terms, while the second equality follows from Assumption 2.
Similarly, we can identify the composition eﬀect and the incentive eﬀect of the wage
on performance, respectively, as:
























In both equations, the ﬁrst equality follows from Assumption 3 and the sample restriction
to reelected politicians, while the second equality follows from Assumption 2.10
9If experience enhanced performance more for high-skilled than for low-skilled mayors (that is, exph >
exp`), we could still identify the overall eﬀect of the wage on performance, but we would overestimate
(underestimate) the composition (incentive) component. In Section 5.3, we come back to this point from
an empirical point of view and show that the eﬀect of administrative experience on performance does not
depend on political selection.
10To leave the framework as simple as possible, so far we have not contemplated the pure motivational
eﬀect of an increase in the salary on performance (Akerlof, 1982). Experimental evidence suggests this
eﬀect being relatively small (Gneezy and List, 2006). If there were any, the potential performance should
be rewritten as: Yk = S(Xk+vk)+Ik+Mk, where Mk represents the morale eﬀect associated with the wage
Wk. It is easy to show that, while φper would still identify the incentive eﬀect (Mk would cancel out in
113.3 Estimation
In order to test (H1), (H2), (H2.1), and (H2.2), we need to implement equations (1), (3),
(4), and (5). Basically, this is a problem of estimating the boundary points of two (or
four) regression functions. Various semiparametric and nonparametric methods have been
proposed for that purpose. We apply both a local linear regression approach as suggested
by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and a split polynomial approximation in the spirit of Lee
(2008). The ﬁrst method ﬁts linear regression functions to the observations distributed
within a distance ∆ on either side of the threshold. To implement equation (1), we restrict
the sample to towns in the interval Pi ∈ [Pc − ∆,Pc + ∆] and estimate the model:
Xi = δ0 + δ1P
∗
i + Di(γ0 + γ1P
∗
i ) + ηi, (6)
where Xi captures some observable traits of the mayor or candidates, Di is a treatment
dummy equal to one if Pi ≥ Pc, and the normalized variable P∗
i = Pi − Pc allows us to
interpret γ0 as the jump between the two regression lines at Pc. As a result: τsel = γ0.
We select the bandwidth ∆ in two ways: applying a cross-validation method (Ludwig
and Miller, 2007); dividing the optimal bandwidth by half to assess the sensitivity of the
results to the chosen ∆ (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).11 As the same city is observed in
diﬀerent terms, we control for intra-city correlation in the error term ηi.
As an alternative to local linear regression, we use the whole sample and choose a
ﬂexible functional form speciﬁcation to ﬁt the relationship between Xi and Pi on either











i ) + ηi. (7)
Usually, a third-grade polynomial (p = 3) is used in the empirical literature. This method
is attractive for many reasons, although a possible concern is that it may be sensitive to
outcome values of observations far away from the threshold.
equation 5), the same would not be true for σper in equation (4), as it would contain both the composition
and the motivational eﬀect. We might worry the latter component being particularly important in the
political arena, where work norms are more eﬀective as mayors’ decisions are always under the spotlight.
In this case, σper should then be interpreted as a broader complement of the incentive eﬀect.




i=1(Xi− ˆ X∆(Pi))2, where, for every Pi to the left (right) of the threshold Pc, we predict ˆ X∆(Pi) as if
it were at the boundary of the estimation using only observations in the interval [Pi−∆,Pi] ([Pi,Pi+∆]).
We choose the optimal ∆ among all multiples of 50 up to 1,500.
12In a similar way, to implementequations (3), (4), and (5), we ﬁt two diﬀerent regression
functions on both sides of the threshold Pc: one for politicians without a binding term limit
(TL = 0) and one for politicians with a binding term limit (TL = 1). The jump in the
regression functions for the subsample TL = 0 can be interpreted as an estimate of τper,
while the jump in the regression functions for the subsample TL = 1 can be seen as an
estimate of σper. The diﬀerence between the two jumps produces an estimate of φper.
Formally, with the local linear regression approach, we choose ∆ with cross-validation,
restrict the sample to cities in the interval Pi ∈ [Pc −∆,Pc +∆], and estimate the model:
Yi = δ0 + δ1P
∗
i + Di(γ0 + γ1P
∗
i ) + (1 − TLi)[α0 + α1P
∗
i + Di(β0 + β1P
∗
i )] + ξi, (8)
where Yi is some performance indicator for the mayor, Di the treatment, and P∗
i the
normalized population size. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. It is straight-
forward to show that the overall eﬀect of the wage on performance is τper = γ0 +β0 (when
TLi = 0), while the composition eﬀect on performance is σper = γ0 (when TLi = 1). It
follows that the incentive eﬀect on performance is φper = τper − σper = β0. Analogously,

























where the overall, composition, and incentive eﬀects of the wage on performance are
identiﬁed as above: τper = γ0 + β0; σper = γ0; φper = β0.
4 Data
4.1 Institutional framework
The Italian municipal government (Comune) is composed by a mayor (Sindaco), an ex-
ecutive committee (Giunta) appointed by the mayor, and an elected council (Consiglio
Comunale) that supervises the legislative activity of the mayor and endorses the proposed
policies (including the annual budget) with majority rule. Since March 1993, mayors are
directly elected by citizens with plurality rule (single round below 15,000 inhabitants and
runoﬀ above) and are subject to a two-term limit (unless, after April 2000, one of the
two terms lasted for less than two years). In 1993, the duration of a legislative term was
13reduced from ﬁve to four years, then restored to ﬁve years in 2000. Italian municipalities
are in charge of a vast number of services, from water supply to waste management, from
municipal police to certain infrastructures, from housing to welfare policies.
The remuneration of the mayor depends on the size of the resident population, as
measured by the national Census that takes place every ten years, and sharply changes at
nine diﬀerent thresholds.12 Nominal salaries have been adjusted almost every year to ac-
count for price inﬂation, so that real values within each population bracket have remained
almost unchanged from 1993 to 2004 (see Table 1), in line with the trend in national
per capita income.13 Since adjustments were applied uniformly to all municipalities, the
relative wage between diﬀerent population brackets also remained identical across time.14
The mayor’s wage, however, is not the only policy varying with population size. In
Table 2, we present a summary of all the policiesbased on population brackets. Besides the
salary of the mayor, population size also determines the compensation of the members of
the executive committee (between 15 and 75 percent of the mayor’s) and of the councillors
(as of 2000, a ﬁche between 18 and 36 euros for each session attended); the size of the
council (ranging from 12 to 60); the size of the executive committee (ranging from 4 to
16); the electoral rule (single round versus runoﬀ voting); whether or not a municipality
can have additional elective bodies in every neighborhood.
Table 2 shows that only three out of the nine wage thresholds determine a variation
solely in the remuneration of the mayor (or of the other members of the municipal gov-
ernment): 1,000, 5,000, and 50,000. In all of the other cases, in fact, the wage increase
overlaps with additional policies whose eﬀect cannot be dismissed. Because the wage in-
crease at 1,000 was only introduced in April 2000 and our dataset does not contain budget
information after 2005, we cannot use this threshold in our analysis, as we are unable to
calculate performance indicators for mayors elected for two consecutive terms after 2000.
Because of the very small sample size around 50,000 inhabitants (see Table 3), we cannot
12For the period covered in our sample, two Censuses were held in 1991 and 2001.
13The average real disposable income remained almost unchanged from the beginning to the end of
the 1990s in Italy, decreasing in the ﬁrst half and going back to the initial level in the second half.
Source: Bank of Italy, Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), waves 1993–2004. Employed
individuals between 18 and 65; gross income (as employee, self-employed, or entrepreneur) recovered by
increasing the disposable income available in the SHIW by the corresponding tax rate.
14Legislative references in hierarchical and chronological order: Laws 816/1985, 81/1993, and 265/1999;
Decreti del Ministero dell’Interno 11/4/1988, 2/4/1991, 4/7/1994, 12/3/1997, and 4/4/2000.
14use this threshold either. As a result, we focus on the 5,000 threshold only, with an addi-
tional caveat: since 2002, municipalities above 5,000 are subject to the Internal Stability
Pact, a set of rules decided by the national government to improve ﬁscal discipline at the
municipality level. We therefore restrict our analysis to mayoral terms from 1993 to 2001.
As of 2000, the real gross wage of the mayor ranges from 1,291 euros per month for
municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants up to 7,798 euros for those with more than
1,000,000 people (see Table 2). At the 5,000 threshold, the gross salary of the mayor
increases by 28.6% (from 2,169 to 2,789 euros), which is 33.3% before 2000 (see Table 1).
These numbers are quite sizable if compared to the rest of the population. In 2000, the
average gross labor income in Italian cities with less than 5,000 inhabitants was 1,375 euros
per month for men and 1,067 for women, while in cities between 5,000 and 20,000 it was
1,468 and 1,135, respectively.15 Especially in small cities, it seems that being appointed
as mayor provides a signiﬁcant source of income for a large fraction of the population.
Before moving to the data, it is worth addressing three speciﬁc aspects of the Italian
institutional framework that, to a certain extent, might aﬀect the interpretation of our
results. First of all, the compensation of the members of the executive committee changes
along with the compensation of the mayor. Although the overall eﬀect might be interesting
per se (that is, the eﬀect of an increase in the salary of all the members of the executive
oﬃce), we cannot separately identify the eﬀect of a change in the wage of the mayor.
However, since the magnitude of the compensation of the executive committee is very
small, it is plausible to assume that the main eﬀect of increasingthe remunerationof elected
oﬃcials is actually driven by the mayor being paid more, the compensation packages for
other politicians being second-order.
Second, mayors can keep their job and cumulate earnings, the only restriction being
that if they work as dependent employees, they have to ask for a leave-of-absence, otherwise
the salary is cut by half.16 The possibility of making outside income, however, only aﬀects
the external validity of our results. In other words, what we are estimating is the impact
of politicians’ wage in a situation where the elective oﬃce is compatible with outside work,
as opposed to the situation in which it is not, and we know from the discussion in Section
15Source: see footnote 13.
16Strict incompatibilities apply instead to any appointment in companies or entities under the control
of the municipality (see Decreto Legislativo 267/2000).
152.1 that the impact of the wage on political selection may diﬀer in the two cases (see
Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni, 2008). To assess the relevance of outside work
in our data, we conducted a phone interview survey of all mayors in towns from 4,900 to
5,100 inhabitants (in oﬃce on May 1, 2009). We obtained replies from 36 out of 57 mayors.
The fraction of part-time mayors was 53%, with the others working full-time as mayor.
Importantly, this fraction was almost identical for towns below and above 5,000 (54%
and 53%, respectively).17 It seems therefore that the time devoted to oﬃce is relevant
and potentially associated to a sizable opportunity cost. Furthermore, it should be noted
that outside income is an important motivation also for politicians at the national level,
given that it is unconstrained in almost all parliaments of democratic countries, the only
exception being the U.S. Congress.
Finally, under speciﬁc and documented circumstances, the executive committee can
grant up to an additional 15% increase to the mayor, conditional on the approval of the
Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs. If applied, this policy would simply change the (quantitative)
interpretation of the estimated eﬀects. Suppose for example that all towns above 5,000
chose to increase the salary, while all towns below did not. In this case, we would estimate
the eﬀect of a 48% wage increase. In the opposite case, where all towns above 5,000
increase the salary, while the others do not, there is a 18% increase. According to the
mentioned survey of mayors around 5,000, however, only very few municipalities (two
out of 36, both above the threshold) introduced a wage raise, so that we can conﬁdently
conclude that we are estimating the impact of a 33% wage increase at 5,000.
4.2 Sample selection and variables
The original dataset contains the mayoral terms elected from 1993 to 2005 for all Italian
municipalities. It carries information about gender, age, highest educational attainment
(self-declared), political aﬃliation, and previous job (self-declared) of the elected mayor
and the losing mayoral candidates, as well as yearly information at the municipality level
about the budget components (i.e., subcategories of revenues and expenditures) and some
administrative indicators (i.e., speed of revenues collection and payment).18
17The (self-declared) weekly working hours of full-time mayors were 38, those of part-time mayors 28.
18The individual-level data were provided by the Statistical Oﬃce of the Italian Ministry of Internal
Aﬀairs, the town-level data by ANCI (Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani).
16Table 3 shows that the Italian territory is very fragmented, with the great majority
of the municipalities having a population size below 10,000 (about 87.0% as of 1991, and
86.6% as of 2001), or even below 5,000 (72.7% as of 1991, and 72.2% as of 2001). It is
also worth noticing that no much changed in the population distribution between the 1991
Census and the 2001 Census, which is reassuring against the presence of migration ﬂows
in reaction to policy changes at diﬀerent population thresholds.19
In Table 4, we pool together all the mayoral terms between 1993 and 2001 and summa-
rize the characteristics of both the three best candidates and the elected mayor for whom
we have non-missing information—31,822 candidates and 16,393 mayors—by population
size.20 On average, 7% of the candidates are women, aged 46.6, and with about 13.8 years
of schooling (i.e., high-school level). Almost 14% were not employed (either unemployed
or out of the labor force) before the election, while 45% were employed in high-skilled
occupations (lawyers, professors, physicians, self-employed, and entrepreneurs), and 20%
in low-skilled occupations (blue collars, clerks, and technicians), with other types of jobs
in the residual category. As far as the population size increases, candidates are more
educated, less likely to be non-employed or low-skilled, and more likely to be high-skilled.
These patterns are likely to pass-through to the winner of the electoral race. Accordingly,
we also observe similar levels and trends for the elected mayors.
As budget indicators we use the following variables per capita (and per calendar year):
total expenditure, total revenues, and deﬁcit. To assess budget management and priorities,
we also look at the following items: i) expenditure for investments(“capital expenditure”),
personnel and debt service (“rigid expenditure”), or goods and services (“current expendi-
ture”); ii) revenues from transfers (from the European Union, the national, or the regional
government), taxes, or tariﬀs. All variables are averaged over the term, excluding election
years to avoid the overlapping of diﬀerent mayors over the same calendar year.21 Because
of missing observations, the budget sample is smaller: 14,115 mayoral terms.
19Between 1991 and 2001, only 40 cities moved from above to below 5,000 and 105 from below to above.
Diﬀerences in population growth above and belove the policy thresholds are never statistically signiﬁcant.
20We could not recover information about any other candidate. However, only 2.79% of the electoral
races had more than three candidates, 18.92% had exactly three, 63.37% had two, and 14.92% were
uncontested.
21Municipal elections in Italy are usually held in the late Spring, so that the electoral and the calendar
year do not coincide. All the results on budget performance are also robust to the exclusion of the last
full calendar year in oﬃce, which might capture a lame-duck eﬀect.
17To further evaluate the eﬃciency of the municipal government, we look at two addi-
tional performance measures: the speed of revenues collection (that is, the ratio between
the collected tax and transfer revenues and the total amount of assessed revenues that
the municipality should collect) and the speed of payment (that is, the ratio between the
outlays actually paid and the outlays committed in the municipality budget). These mea-
sures are particularly suited for inferring about the administrative IQ of mayors, while
this is not necessarily the case with the other budget variables, which might also reﬂect
policy preferences.
Table 5 contains descriptive statistics of the performance indicators (in 2000 real terms
for per capita variables). On average, total expenditure amounts to 1,401.93 euros per
capita, total revenues to 1,382.20 euros, and the resulting average deﬁcit is 19.73 euros.
Both revenues and expenditure have a U-shaped relationship with population size: they
decrease at ﬁrst, possibly because of economies of scale in running the administrative
machine, and then rise again for citiesabove 50,000, where more infrastructures are usually
undertaken. When we look at the composition of revenues and expenditure, we can see
that 41% of the expenditure is used to cover investments or other capital outlays (570.01),
29% to cover personnel costs and the debt service (404.30 euros), and the remaining 30% to
purchase goods and services (428.28). As for revenues, 70% are made of transfers (961.07
euros), while 19% are local taxes (264.98), and 11% are tariﬀs for municipal services
(156.15). On average, only 65.5% of due taxes are actually collected over the year, while
79.5% of due payments are actually disbursed over the year.
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, we restrict the sample to the 5,000
threshold, and, for estimation purposes, to cities between 3,250 and 6,750 resident inhab-
itants, so as to stay suﬃciently away from other thresholds. This leaves us with 3,039
mayoral terms around 5,000. In most estimations reported in the next section, the sample
size is further restricted according to the bandwidth choice (∆) and the sample restriction
to mayors reelected for two consecutive terms (see Section 3).
185 Empirical results
5.1 Testing for nonrandom sorting above the threshold
In this section, we assess the validity of the RDD identiﬁcation strategy discussed in
Section 3 with two diﬀerent testing procedures. First, to formally check for the absence
of manipulation of the running variable at 5,000 (violated if mayors were able to alter
population size and sort above the threshold), we test the null hypothesis of continuity of
the density of population size at 5,000 as proposed by McCrary (2008). Second, we check
whether invariant characteristics of the municipalities, such as area size and geographic
location, are balanced in the neighborhood of 5,000.
In Figure 1, we plot the frequency of municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants,
using diﬀerent binsizes (100, 250, and 500 inhabitants) for the 2001 Census.22 We can
see that the distribution is positively skewed, with a pick around 700. Visual inspection
does not reveal any clear discontinuity at the wage thresholds (1,000 and 5,000), although
the same is not true for the other policy thresholds (3,000, 10,000, and 15,000), where it
seems that cities managed to sort just above the policy cutoﬀ. Although the Census is run
independently by the National Statistical Oﬃce, so that false reporting should be ruled
out, it could still be the case that municipalities succeed in sorting above the thresholds
by attracting citizens to their territory from other towns (e.g., by means of urbanization
plans or tax rebates for owners who acquire their oﬃcial residence in the municipality).
For this reason, in Figure 2, we zoom on the shape of the running variable around the
5,000 threshold. There, no evidence of manipulative sorting can be detected.
We formally test for the presence of a density discontinuity at the 5,000 threshold in
Figure 3, where a McCrary test is performed by running kernel local linear regressions
of the log of the density separately on both sides of the threshold (McCrary, 2008). As
we can see from the ﬁgure, the log-diﬀerence between the frequency to the right and
to the left of the threshold is not statistically signiﬁcant. In fact, the point estimate is
-0.007 (with a standard error of 0.236).23 We are aware that a density test may have
22We do not consider municipalities above 20,000 inhabitants because of the small sample size in that
range. Figures for the 1991 Census are identical and are available upon request (see also Table 3).
23The computed optimal bandwidth is 546.33, while the computed optimal binsize is 52.16. We thank
Justin McCrary for providing us with the Stata codes to perform this test.
19low power if manipulation has occurred on both sides of the threshold. In that case, the
monotonicity assumption does not hold, and there might be nonrandom sorting even if
this would not be detected in the distribution of the running variable. However, we do
not know of any reason why mayors may want to sort below 5,000, while the wage policy
provides an incentive to sort above the threshold. The evidence of no sorting above 5,000
is thus reassuring. Mayors alone are not able (or willing) to manipulate population size:
in fact, even if they did it, they would not stay in power enough time (especially after
the introduction of the two-term limit) to grasp the beneﬁts of sorting above the 5,000
threshold in the following Census. On the contrary, we may expect a broader interest for
twisting the population size at other thresholds, where all the local politicians have the
incentive to coordinate their eﬀorts to attract new residents, so as to increase political
oﬃces and rents.
In Table 6, we further check for manipulative sorting by performing balance tests on
the available invariant town characteristics. If there were nonrandom sorting, we should
expect some of these characteristics to diﬀer systematically between treated and untreated
municipalities around 5,000. The available pre-treatment characteristics are the size of
the geographical area and the location, because all the other variables in the dataset are
endogenous to the policy. The balance tests are performed using a procedure similar to the
McCrary test, with separate weighted kernel estimations on both sides of the discontinuity
point.24 No pre-treatment characteristics show a signiﬁcant discontinuity at the 5,000
threshold. In particular, the geographical location, which in Italy might be correlated
with social capital and administrative culture, is perfectly balanced.25 Interestingly, even
the political party aﬃliation of the mayor is well balanced around the threshold. Although
this is not a pre-determined characteristic, it is reassuring to ﬁnd that it is balanced as
well, because it guarantees that the diﬀerences we may ﬁnd in budget performance are
not due to diﬀerent political views on the way ﬁscal policy should be conducted.
24We use a binsize equal to 10 and three diﬀerent bandwidths: 125, 150, and 175.
25Indeed, Nannicini (2009) ﬁnds that manipulative sorting at 3,000, 10,000, 15,000, and 30,000 only
takes place in areas with low social capital, as measured by blood donation and non-proﬁt organizations.
Also in those areas, however, there is no manipulation at the 1,000 and 5,000 wage thresholds.
205.2 The eﬀect of the wage on political selection
In this section, we analyze whether paying politicians more aﬀects the selection into poli-
tics. In Table 7 and Table 8, we look at whether a higher remuneration has an eﬀect on the
quality of the best three candidates and the elected mayors, respectively, by estimating
equation (6) with local linear regression and equation (7) with a split polynomial.
As we can see in Table 7, the 33% wage increase (28% after 2000) at the 5,000 threshold
has a sizable and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the educational level of candidates.
Candidates to a better paid oﬃce turn out to have from 0.905 to 1.205 years of schooling
more. This corresponds to an increase from +6.4% to +8.6% with respect to the aver-
age value of 14.06 years in the 3,000-5,000 population bracket. Using the half optimal
bandwidth and the third-grade split polynomial approximation, we also detect a positive
eﬀect on the proportion of high-skilled candidates (9.2 and 16.2 percentage points more,
respectively, +18% and +33% with respect to an average of 0.49). This selection eﬀect
of the wage on the quality of candidates transfers almost one-to-one into the quality of
elected mayors. The impact on the mayors’ education ranges from 0.879 (+6.2%) to 1.633
(+11.5%) years of schooling more. And the impact on the fraction of high-skilled mayors
is positive with the half bandwidth and the split polynomial.26
These results are consistent with the descriptive plots in Figure 4 and Figure 5, where
we draw scatters of the observed values, plus a running-mean smoothing performed sepa-
rately on either side of the threshold. The sharp jump when moving from the left to the
right of the threshold is particularly evident for the years of schooling, but not for the
other variables, where there is more noise.
In Table 9, we perform a robustness check including the available predetermined vari-
ables (that is, geographical size and location) as covariates in the baseline local linear
regression speciﬁcation. If these variables were balanced around the threshold, estimates
should be insensitive to their inclusion. We do not detect any diﬀerence with respect
to the baseline estimates. In Table 10, we implement placebo tests by estimating the
treatment eﬀect at fake thresholds, where there should be no eﬀect. In particular, we
look at the median below and the median above 5,000 inhabitants, excluding cities within
250 inhabitants from other true policy cutoﬀs. We then estimate the treatment eﬀect on
26Results are robust to the use of a fourth-grade polynomial (available upon request).
21several variables using the split polynomial. With only one exception, the eﬀects at the
fake thresholds are never statistically diﬀerent from zero.27
To sum up, the 33% wage increase at 5,000 is able to attract more educated candidates.
Not surprisingly, this translates into more educated mayors. The eﬀect of the wage on
education at the 5,000 threshold is always statistically signiﬁcant, most of the time at the
1% level. Indeed, if we take into account that, in municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants,
the gross labor income per month for people without (with) a high-school degree was
on average 1,137 (1,357) euros in 2000, while people with college education earned 1,594
euros, the selection eﬀect of a wage increase of 620 euros is hardly surprising.28 There
is also some evidence that a higher wage attracts relatively more politicians employed in
high-skilled occupations, pointing to the fact that the time devoted to the oﬃce is an
important component of the opportunity cost of entering politics (the gross labor income
per month for high-skilled people was on average 1,352 euros in 2000).29
5.3 The eﬀect of the wage on performance
We now investigate whether the salary aﬀects the way the mayor runs the municipality.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate equation (8) with local linear regression and equation (9) with a
split polynomial, to obtain both the overall eﬀect of the wage on performance (identiﬁed
on mayors with a slack term limit) and the composition eﬀect of the wage on performance
(identiﬁed on mayors with a binding term limit), recovering at the same time the incentive
eﬀect as the diﬀerence between the two.
27Placebo tests at the 25th and 75th percentiles deliver the same conclusion, but the sample size is
considerably lower (results available upon request).
28Source: see footnote 13. We also performed the RDD estimations separately for the North and the
South of the country. The eﬀect of the wage on years of schooling and high-skilled occupations remains
statistically diﬀerent from zero in both samples, but the point estimates are greater in the South, where
the lower cost of living ampliﬁes the impact of a wage increase (results available upon request).
29We ran the same exercise for the available data around the 1,000 threshold (from 2000 only), and
found that a 12% wage increase (see Table 1) is not enough to motivate highly educated citizens to
enter politics (results available on a previous working-paper version of this paper, see Gagliarducci and
Nannicini, 2008). At 1,000 inhabitants, we only observe a pale reduction in the percentage of candidates
employed in low-skilled occupations. While we would be tempted to attribute the diﬀerent eﬀect between
the 1,000and 5,000threshold to the intensity of the treatment, we have to acknowledge that the two (local)
results refer to diﬀerent time periods (2000-2007 and 1993-2001, respectively), and that the composition
of the reference labor force might also diﬀer greatly in the two situations (e.g., less high-skilled and college
graduates in smaller cities). Furthermore, the wage might have a delayed eﬀect on political selection, not
captured in the exercise at 1,000 because this threshold was only introduced in 2000.
22If we look at the overall eﬀect, the ﬁrst result to notice in Table 11 is that paying a
mayor 33% more reduces the size of the municipality budget, as both total expenditure
and revenues per capita decrease by a signiﬁcant amount (-199.59 and -196.21 euros, re-
spectively, in both cases about -17.6% with respect to the 3,000-5,000 average values).
Looking at expenditure subcategories, we can see that the budget reduction is mostly
driven by a signiﬁcant cut in expenditure for goods and services (-86.46 euros, -21.8%).
Personnel expenditure is reduced by 35.75 euros (-11.1%), while for investments the re-
duction is not statistically signiﬁcant. As for collected revenues, there is a consistent
reduction in taxes and, especially, tariﬀs (-31.81 and -121.85 euros, respectively, -12.6%
and -75%), while there is no signiﬁcant evidence of a decline in transfers from the other
levels of government. We ﬁnd very similar results using the half bandwidth or the split
polynomial approximation, although the reduction in taxes loses statistical signiﬁcance.
Since revenues and expenditure move in the same direction, the eﬀect on the deﬁcit is
not statistically diﬀerent from zero. A graphical representation of the overall eﬀect of the
wage on the budget variables can be found in Figure 6.
Looking at the other estimates in Table 11, it is clear, though, that most of the overall
eﬀect comes from the selection of diﬀerent politicians, rather than from the interaction
between a high wage and the willingness to be reelected.30 As a matter of fact, the
incentive eﬀect is never signiﬁcant, both in size and in statistical terms. Among mayors
with a binding term limit (composition eﬀect), instead, those who are paid more reduce
expenditures, taxes, and tariﬀs. In other words, for the reduction in taxes, tariﬀs, and
current expenditure, selection is clearly the driving force behind the overall eﬀect.31
30Note that 66% of mayors rerun for a second term, and 78% of them are reelected. As a matter of
fact, we also ﬁnd that being paid more has an eﬀect on the decision to run for reelection (8 percentage
points more, signiﬁcant at the 5% level), but not on the probability of being reelected or on the margin of
victory. This is because, as we showed in the previous section, a higher wage also attracts a better pool
of (losing) candidates.
31As discussed in Section 3.2, mayors in the second term might also have the incentive to perform well
because they plan to run for higher oﬃces. As these incentives do not depend on the wage, they should
not aﬀect our identiﬁcation strategy, unless they were completely ﬁrst-order. We actually observe that,
in municipalities between 3,500 and 6,500 inhabitants, only 5.3% of the mayors were appointed in the
provincial government after the term limit, 1.8% in the regional government, and 0.4% in the national
parliament. Importantly, we do not detect any diﬀerence in the career prospects of mayors above and
below the 5,000 threshold.
23This exercise, of course, is based on the assumption—shared by the literature on po-
litical agency and political budget cycles—that voters care about public revenues and
expenditures, and keep politicians accountable for the government budget. An alternative
explanation for the lack of a reelection incentive could be that Italian voters have strong
ideological preferences (“party alignment”), which makes the threat of non-reelection less
credible. To be sure that this is not the case, in the top panel of Table 12, we run the
same exercise as in Table 11 restricting the sample to mayors whose electoral margin in
the ﬁrst term was small, that is, mayors who obtained less than 55% of the votes. In this
subsample, one can expect swing voters to be decisive and then the reelection motive to be
stronger. Even in this case, there is no evidence that a higher wage has an impact through
the willingness to be reelected, which makes us think that our result simply reﬂects the
strength of the composition eﬀect over the incentive eﬀect of the wage.
A second robustness check concerns administrative experience. In the framework out-
lined in Section 3.2, we assumed that all mayors without a binding term limit were in the
ﬁrst term, while all mayors with a binding term limit were in the second term. However,
this is not always the case in the data. When the term limit was introduced, in fact, it
only applied to terms elected after 1993, no matter the previous ones. For this reason,
we observe some mayors in the third or fourth term. In the middle panel of Table 12, we
present the same estimates as in Table 11 but restricting the sample to mayors elected
for the ﬁrst time after March 1993. The results are almost unchanged. We conclude that
diﬀerences in administrative experience do not bias our baseline results. This is also re-
assuring about our assumption that the eﬀect of experience is the same above and below
5,000 inhabitants (see again Section 3.2), otherwise this robustness exercise should diﬀer
from the baseline results.
In the bottom panel of Table 12, we perform the same robustness check as for the
estimates on political selection; that is, we include the invariant town characteristics as
additional covariates in the local linear regression estimation. As we can see, the results
are almost identical in terms of magnitude to the ones presented in the top panel of Table
11. Finally, in Table 13, we test for the treatment eﬀect at fake thresholds, where there
should be no eﬀect. No jump is ever statistically diﬀerent from zero.
24Although we cannot observe the quality of public goods and services provided at the
municipality level, the above evidence on the reduction of the government size is consistent
with the fact that the 33% wage increase at 5,000 attracts skilledcitizens, who then run the
government body more cautiously. In particular, they lower the tax and tariﬀ burden, by
reducing sources of waste in current outlays, while leaving almost unchanged other sources
of expenditure. Indeed, empirical evidence about Italy shows that passive waste—that is,
ineﬃciency due to red tape—is concentrated on expenditures for goods and services at
the local level (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009). An alternative interpretation of our
results, however, is that the reduction in government size reﬂects diﬀerences in preferences;
that is, a higher wage attracts more educated individuals, who are generally more reluctant
toward redistribution even after controlling for income (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). This
would be true, on average, for candidates of both the center-left and center-right coalition
(see Table 6). And voters could accept the implicit policy change in exchange for the
greater competence of these politicians.
To shed more light on these two alternative exlanations, in Table 14, we perform the
RDD estimations on the speed of revenues collection and the speed of payment, which
we take as a better proxy for administrative eﬃciency. Although the eﬀect is signiﬁcant
only at the 10% level, there is some evidence that better paid mayors increase the speed
of revenues collection. According to the local linear regression estimation, they speed it
up by about 4.5 percentage points (+6.9% with respect to the 3,000-5,000 average value),
while there is no robust evidence of an eﬀect on the speed of payment.32 This is consistent
with the view that, while the reduction in the government size could still reﬂect some
diﬀerences in the preferences of the elected mayors, at least part of this eﬀect is driven by
a general improvement in the eﬃciency of the bureaucratic organization.
In Table 15, we run the same robustness exercises as for the budget variables, and ﬁnd
similar numbers, although the lower sample size for the two eﬃciency measures comes at
the price of a reduction in statistical signiﬁcance. Finally, placebo tests in Table 16 further
reassure against the presence of any eﬀect beyond the policy threshold.
32Note that this result is not in contrast with the reduction in tax revenues, as the speed of revenues
collection follows a cash basis accounting, while tax revenues follow an accruals principle of accounting.
256 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that paying politicians more has a positive eﬀect on the
quality of elected oﬃcials (that is, education and professional background), and it also
aﬀects the way they manage public ﬁnance. In particular, better paid politicians lower
the size of the municipal government, by reducing taxes, tariﬀs, and current expenditure,
as the result of an improvement in the eﬃciency of the municipal organization. Results
also show that this performance eﬀect is due to the selection of more skilled mayors, rather
than the incentive to be reelected.
It is important to stress that our empirical exercise—which is local in nature as any
RDD—cannot help determining the optimal wage level, that is, it cannot identify the
upper limit over which the welfare beneﬁt from paying politicians more is completely
oﬀset by the wage increase itself. Yet, it makes clear that the monetary remuneration
is a relevant motivation for citizens willing to run for elective oﬃces. While the obvious
recommendation would be to increase the salary paid to politicians, our exercise also
suggests that, in addition to population size, the salary could be linked to the private
sector compensation for similar occupations. By doing so, voters could eﬀectively compete
with the market in recruiting competent citizens.
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29Tables and Figures
Table 1: Mayor’s gross monthly wage over time (in 2000 euros)
Year Population brackets
Below 1,000- 3,000- 5,000- 10,000- 30,000- 50,000- 100,000- 250,000- Above
1,000 3,000 5,000 10,000 30,000 50,000 100,000 250,000 500,000 500,000
1993 1,227 1,227 1,841 2,455 2,455 2,762 3,375 3,989 4,603 6,137
1994 1,306 1,306 1,959 2,612 2,612 2,939 3,592 4,245 4,898 6,531
1995 1,240 1,240 1,860 2,480 2,480 2,790 3,410 4,030 4,650 6,200
1996 1,190 1,190 1,785 2,381 2,381 2,678 3,273 3,869 4,464 5,952
1997 1,286 1,286 1,929 2,571 2,571 2,893 3,536 4,178 4,821 6,428
1998 1,262 1,262 1,892 2,523 2,523 2,838 3,469 4,100 4,731 6,308
1999 1,241 1,241 1,861 2,482 2,482 2,792 3,412 4,033 4,653 6,204
2000 1,291 1,446 2,169 2,789 3,099 3,460 4,132 5,010 5,784 7,798
2001 1,256 1,407 2,110 2,713 3,014 3,366 4,019 4,873 5,627 7,586
2002 1,226 1,373 2,060 2,648 2,943 3,286 3,924 4,757 5,493 7,406
2003 1,291 1,446 2,169 2,789 3,099 3,460 4,132 5,010 5,784 7,798
2004 1,263 1,415 2,122 2,728 3,031 3,385 4,042 4,901 5,659 7,629
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants as measured by the last available Census. The real monthly salary is
computed using the OECD CPI index.
Table 2: Legislative thresholds for Italian municipalities
Population Wage Wage Fiche Ex. Com. Council Electoral Neighbor. Stability
Mayor Ex. Com. Council Size Size Rule Councils Pact
Below 1,000 1,291 15% 18 4 12 single no no
1,000-3,000 1,446 20% 18 4 12 single no no
3,000-5,000 2,169 20% 18 4 16 single no no
5,000-10,000 2,789 50% 18 4 16 single no since 2002
10,000-15,000 3,099 55% 22 6 20 single no since 2002
15,000-30,000 3,099 55% 22 6 20 runoﬀ no since 2002
30,000-50,000 3,460 55% 36 6 30 runoﬀ allowed since 2002
50,000-100,000 4,132 75% 36 6 30 runoﬀ allowed since 2002
100,000-250,000 5,010 75% 36 10 40 runoﬀ yes since 2002
250,000-500,000 5,784 75% 36 12 46 runoﬀ yes since 2002
Above 500,000 7,798 75% 36 14-16 50-60 runoﬀ yes since 2002
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants as measured by the last available Census. Wage Mayor and Wage
Ex. Com. refer to the monthly gross wage of the mayor and the members of the executive committee, respectively; the latter is
expressed as a percentage of the former, which refers to 2000 and is measured in euros. Fiche Council is the reimbursement per
session paid to councillors and is measured in euros. The wage thresholds at 1,000 and 10,000 were introduced in 2000; all of the
others date back to 1960. Ex. Com. Size is the maximum allowed number of executives appointed by the mayor. Council Size
is the number of seats in the City Council. All of the size thresholds were set in 1960. Since 1993, Electoral Rule can be either
single round (with 60% premium) or runoﬀ (with 66% premium) plurality voting. Neighborhood Councils are bodies that represent
diﬀerent neighborhoods within the city and are provided with independent budgets. Stability Pact refers to a set of rules decided
by the central government to impose ﬁscal discipline on local authorities.
30Table 3: Population distribution
Population 1991 Census 2001 Census




















Above 500,000 6 6
(0.08) (0.08)
Total 7,956 7,741
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants as measured by
the last available Census. Percentage values in parentheses.
31Table 4: Characteristics of candidates and elected mayors
Population Female Age Years of Not High-skilled Low-skilled
schooling employed occupation occupation
All candidates
Below 1,000 0.07 47.00 12.24 0.19 0.30 0.30
1,000-3,000 0.07 46.26 13.58 0.15 0.42 0.21
3,000-5,000 0.06 46.27 14.06 0.13 0.49 0.18
5,000-10,000 0.08 46.22 14.36 0.12 0.52 0.16
10,000-15,000 0.07 46.68 14.81 0.09 0.55 0.15
15,000-30,000 0.07 47.17 15.09 0.08 0.61 0.13
30,000-50,000 0.07 47.43 15.43 0.06 0.63 0.10
50,000-100,000 0.05 49.16 15.81 0.05 0.71 0.09
Above 100,000 0.08 51.75 15.80 0.08 0.74 0.05
Total 0.07 46.59 13.76 0.14 0.45 0.20
Obs. 31,822 31,822 31,822 31,822 31,822 31,822
Elected mayors
Below 1,000 0.06 47.60 12.38 0.18 0.31 0.28
1,000-3,000 0.06 46.43 13.74 0.13 0.45 0.19
3,000-5,000 0.06 46.44 14.22 0.11 0.50 0.15
5,000-10,000 0.08 45.98 14.48 0.10 0.53 0.14
10,000-15,000 0.06 46.45 14.99 0.07 0.58 0.13
15,000-30,000 0.06 46.75 15.16 0.06 0.59 0.13
30,000-50,000 0.05 47.12 15.44 0.03 0.63 0.10
50,000-100,000 0.05 48.10 15.87 0.04 0.70 0.09
Above 100,000 0.08 51.93 15.82 0.05 0.75 0.03
Total 0.07 46.73 13.80 0.12 0.46 0.19
Obs. 16,393 16,393 16,393 16,393 16,393 16,393
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the last Census. The other columns report average
values. All variables are dummies, except Age and Years of schooling (both measured in years). Years of schooling is the
number of years needed to complete the highest degree obtained. Not employed includes unemployed, retired, and any
other individual out of the labor force. High-skilled occupation includes lawyers, professors, physicians, self-employed, and
entrepreneurs. Low-skilled occupation includes blue collars, clerks, and technicians. Other types of occupationin the residual
category. Terms from 1993 to 2001.
32Table 5: Budget performance
Population Deﬁcit Expenditure Revenues Eﬃciency
Total Investments Personnel Goods and Total Transfers Taxes Tariﬀs Speed of Speed of
and debt services collection payment
Below 1,000 27.00 2,068.17 1,010.55 593.96 465.75 2,041.17 1,555.41 280.05 205.70 65.93 80.06
1,000-3,000 17.21 1,325.88 547.10 379.57 399.70 1,308.66 924.39 242.43 141.85 65.66 80.36
3,000-5,000 20.22 1,134.89 416.51 322.63 395.75 1,114.67 732.24 246.93 135.49 65.32 79.45
5,000-10,000 13.57 1,026.93 310.14 303.99 412.79 1,013.36 603.30 274.93 135.12 65.26 78.49
10,000-15,000 18.94 1,075.52 302.45 315.50 457.58 1,056.59 617.49 291.65 147.44 65.09 78.14
15,000-30,000 18.39 1,072.24 279.52 316.40 476.33 1,053.85 600.47 299.92 153.46 65.43 77.47
30,000-50,000 17.72 1,083.36 262.64 332.95 487.78 1,065.64 613.81 313.70 138.12 63.65 75.58
50,000-100,000 23.53 1,272.23 327.46 377.95 566.82 1,248.70 763.53 324.93 160.24 62.31 75.19
Above 100,000 25.65 1,587.29 419.17 465.25 702.87 1,561.64 980.50 407.52 173.62 66.69 76.32
Total 19.74 1,401.93 570.01 404.30 428.28 1,382.20 961.07 264.98 156.15 65.51 79.47
Obs. 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the last Census. The other columns report average values. All budget variables (i.e., deﬁcit, types of expenditure,
and types of revenues) are in per-capita terms, expressed in euros at 2000 prices, and averaged over the mayoral term (election years excluded). The Transfers variable refers to external
transfers from the central government, the regional government, or the European Union. The Eﬃciency measures are expressed in percentage points: Speed of collection is the ratio




Discontinuity 5.866 -0.194 -0.010
(17.904) (0.211) (0.038)
Bandwidth: 150
Discontinuity 6.983 -0.193 0.005
(15.144) (0.195) (0.047)
Bandwidth: 175
Discontinuity 9.905 -0.199 0.013
(13.759) (0.171) (0.051)
Obs. 1,488 1,488 1,488
Notes. Discontinuity of town characteristics at the 5,000 threshold.
Weighted kernel estimation on both sides of the threshold, with binsize
equal to 10 and bandwidth as speciﬁed. Terms from 1993 to 2001; cities
with population between 3,250 and 6,750 inhabitants. Area is measured
in km2. North/South is a dummy equal to 1 for Piemonte, Lombardia,
Val d’Aosta, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Veneto,
Liguria and Emilia-Romagna, and 0 otherwise. Bootstrapped standard er-
rors (200 replications) are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
34Table 7: Candidate selection, RDD estimates
Population Female Age Years of Not High-skilled Low-skilled
schooling employed occupation occupation
LLR with optimal bandwidth
Eﬀect 0.005 -0.951 0.905*** -0.021 0.048 -0.018
(0.018) (0.608) (0.279) (0.024) (0.034) (0.025)
∆ 1,300 1,600 900 1,000 1,500 1,400
Obs. 4,805 5,953 3,295 3,758 5,581 5,191
LLR with half optimal bandwidth
Eﬀect 0.017 -0.664 1.012** -0.032 0.092* -0.043
(0.025) (0.848) (0.424) (0.034) (0.050) (0.035)
∆ 650 800 450 500 750 700
Obs. 2,373 3,064 1,637 1,851 2,728 2,575
Split polynomial approximation
Eﬀect -0.000 -0.257 1.205*** -0.047 0.162** -0.074
(0.030) (1.168) (0.415) (0.035) (0.067) (0.045)
Obs. 6,544 6,544 6,544 6,544 6,544 6,544
Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on the characteristics of the three best candidates. Terms
from 1993 to 2001. First estimate: Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equation (6); the optimal symmetric bandwidth ∆
is chosen with cross-validation methods. Second estimate: LLR with half optimal bandwidth. Third estimate: 3rd order
polynomial approximation on either side of the threshold as in equation (7); the maximum symmetric bandwidth is 1,750.
Age and Years of schooling are measured in years; the other variables are dummies. Not employed includes unemployed,
retired, and any other individual out of the labor force. High-skilled occupation includes lawyers, professors, physicians, self-
employed, and entrepreneurs. Low-skilled occupation includes blue collars, clerks, and technicians. Other types of occupation
in the residual category. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at
the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
35Table 8: Mayor selection, RDD estimates
Population Female Age Years of Not High-skilled Low-skilled
schooling employed occupation occupation
LLR with optimal bandwidth
Eﬀect -0.012 -0.746 0.879** 0.002 0.108 -0.035
(0.034) (1.127) (0.346) (0.031) (0.066) (0.035)
∆ 800 900 1,100 1,200 800 1,400
Obs. 1,340 1,531 1,905 2,053 1,340 2,396
LLR with half optimal bandwidth
Eﬀect 0.032 -0.485 1.174** -0.028 0.162* -0.062
(0.042) (1.658) (0.504) (0.043) (0.094) (0.050)
∆ 400 450 550 600 400 700
Obs. 692 759 913 999 692 1,187
Split polynomial approximation
Eﬀect 0.015 -0.006 1.633*** -0.057 0.217** -0.083
(0.043) (1.631) (0.558) (0.050) (0.090) (0.064)
Obs. 3,039 3,039 3,039 3,039 3,039 3,039
Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on the characteristics of the elected mayor. Terms from 1993
to 2001. First estimate: Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equation (6); the optimal symmetric bandwidth ∆ is chosen
with cross-validation methods. Second estimate: LLR with half optimal bandwidth. Third estimate: 3rd order polynomial
approximation on either side of the threshold as in equation (7); the maximum symmetric bandwidth is 1,750. Age and
Years of schooling are measured in years; the other variables are dummies. Not employed includes unemployed, retired, and
any other individual out of the labor force. High-skilled occupation includes lawyers, professors, physicians, self-employed,
and entrepreneurs. Low-skilled occupation includes blue collars, clerks, and technicians. Other types of occupation in the
residual category. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
36Table 9: Candidate and mayor selection, robustness exercise
Population Female Age Years of Not High-skilled Low-skilled
schooling employed occupation occupation
All candidates
LLR with optimal bandwidth and covariates
Eﬀect 0.009 -0.931 0.846*** -0.017 0.035 -0.010
(0.017) (0.604) (0.271) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024)
∆ 1,300 1,600 900 1,000 1,500 1,400
Obs. 4,805 5,953 3,295 3,758 5,581 5,191
Mayors
LLR with optimal bandwidth and covariates
Eﬀect -0.009 -0.730 0.796** 0.005 0.102 -0.028
(0.033) (1.117) (0.342) (0.031) (0.065) (0.035)
∆ 800 900 1,100 1,200 800 1,400
Obs. 1,340 1,531 1,905 2,053 1,340 2,396
Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on the characteristics of the three best candidates (top
panel) or of the elected mayor (bottom panel). Terms from 1993 to 2001. Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equation
(6), with optimal bandwidth ∆ and invariant town characteristics (Area in km2 and North/South dummy) as additional
covariates. Age and Years of schooling are measured in years; the other variables are dummies. Not employed includes
unemployed, retired, and any other individual out of the labor force. High-skilled occupation includes lawyers, professors,
physicians, self-employed, and entrepreneurs. Low-skilled occupation includes blue collars, clerks, and technicians. Other
types of occupationin the residual category. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipalitylevel are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
37Table 10: Candidate and mayor selection, placebo tests
Population Female Age Years of Not High-skilled Low-skilled
schooling employed occupation occupation
All candidates
Split polynomial approximation, median above (5,956)
Eﬀect 0.008 0.865 -0.082 -0.009 -0.139 0.146**
(0.045) (1.955) (0.627) (0.057) (0.096) (0.058)
Obs. 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072
Split polynomial approximation, median below (3,985)
Eﬀect 0.000 -1.350 0.029 -0.012 -0.013 0.022
(0.033) (1.601) (0.503) (0.050) (0.079) (0.068)
Obs. 3,555 3,555 3,555 3,555 3,555 3,555
Mayors
Split polynomial approximation, median above (5,950)
Eﬀect -0.100 2.111 0.902 -0.041 0.022 0.111
(0.089) (2.562) (0.839) (0.074) (0.146) (0.081)
Obs. 936 936 936 936 936 936
Split polynomial approximation, median below (3,975)
Eﬀect -0.018 2.203 -0.177 -0.020 -0.137 0.085
(0.036) (2.274) (0.663) (0.076) (0.114) (0.085)
Obs. 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes. Estimated discontinuities in the characteristics of the three best candidates (top panel) or of the elected mayor
(bottom panel) at fake thresholds (i.e, median above and below the true 5,000 threshold). Terms elected from 1993 to 2001.
Estimates computed with a 3rd order polynomial approximation on either side of the threshold as in equation (7). Age and
Years of schooling are measured in years; the other variables are dummies. Not employed includes unemployed, retired, and
any other individual out of the labor force. High-skilled occupation includes lawyers, professors, physicians, self-employed,
and entrepreneurs. Low-skilled occupation includes blue collars, clerks, and technicians. Other types of occupation in the
residual category. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
38Table 11: Budget components per capita, RDD estimates
Deﬁcit Expenditure Revenues
Total Investments Personnel Goods and Total Transfers Taxes Tariﬀs
and debt services
LLR with optimal bandwidth
A. Overall (TL=0) -1.865 -228.033*** -60.620 -35.754** -86.455*** -223.187*** -17.272 -31.805* -121.854***
(8.467) (68.072) (50.965) (16.094) (25.596) (67.977) (65.748) (17.319) (42.225)
B. Composition (TL=1) 1.889 -240.415*** -78.392* -32.141 -95.301*** -243.303*** -46.472 -37.947** -116.855***
(4.334) (79.917) (46.457) (22.230) (22.781) (81.588) (53.795) (17.567) (44.992)
C. Incentive (A-B) -3.754 12.383 17.773 -3.613 8.846 20.116 29.200 6.142 -4.999
(8.508) (51.926) (50.056) (18.836) (15.357) (50.558) (63.103) (8.120) (19.529)
∆ 1,200 1,000 1,500 1,100 1,500 1,000 1,400 1,400 1,100
Obs. 816 696 1,016 758 1,016 696 950 950 758
LLR with half optimal bandwidth
A. Overall (TL=0) -7.222 -197.823* -109.295** -34.090* -69.452* -188.134* -68.956 -20.206 -107.796
(9.852) (100.758) (53.738) (19.286) (36.324) (102.562) (64.780) (23.062) (66.880)
B. Composition (TL=1) 20.111*** -247.372* -134.606** -13.161 -76.602** -261.207* -106.596 -26.027 -131.903
(6.905) (128.486) (67.630) (30.676) (30.422) (132.419) (76.243) (23.505) (82.831)
C. Incentive (A-B) -27.333*** 49.549 25.311 -20.929 7.150 73.072 37.640 5.821 24.107
(10.000) (75.272) (53.211) (25.026) (21.671) (74.054) (52.293) (10.699) (25.817)
∆ 600 500 750 550 750 500 700 700 550
Obs. 404 348 510 370 510 348 484 484 370
Split polynomial approximation
A. Overall (TL=0) -8.171 -210.952* -68.139 -42.855 -99.959** -202.782* -59.677 -21.760 -121.345*
(11.020) (117.022) (80.653) (28.933) (50.839) (118.113) (94.985) (31.015) (73.385)
B. Composition (TL=1) 14.075* -254.564** -159.246* -17.092 -78.226** -268.639** -100.668 -23.059 -144.912
(7.841) (128.265) (89.964) (33.567) (39.032) (132.183) (84.790) (30.779) (92.585)
C. Incentive (A-B) -22.246** 43.611 91.108 -25.763 -21.733 65.857 40.991 1.299 23.567
(11.153) (94.144) (89.237) (32.437) (30.088) (92.775) (84.318) (13.437) (27.919)
Obs. 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on budget variables. Terms from 1993 to 2001; only mayors observed for two terms, with binding term limit in the second.
First estimate: Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equation (8); the optimal symmetric bandwidth ∆ is chosen with cross-validation methods. Second estimate: LLR with half optimal
bandwidth. Third estimate: 3rd order polynomial approximation on either side of the threshold as in equation (9); the maximum symmetric bandwidth is 1,750. All variables are in
per-capita terms, expressed in euros at 2000 prices, and averaged over the mayoral term (election years excluded). TL is an index for the term limit. Standard errors robust to clustering
at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.Table 12: Budget components per capita, robustness exercises
Deﬁcit Expenditure Revenues
Total Investments Personnel Goods and Total Transfers Taxes Tariﬀs
and debt services
LLR with optimal bandwidth for contestable cities
A. Overall (TL=0) -10.414 -244.237** -72.462 -46.011 -133.215*** -229.152** 5.003 -22.859 -182.397***
(9.011) (94.823) (63.425) (34.163) (42.694) (95.379) (69.563) (20.164) (68.072)
B. Composition (TL=1) 1.852 -220.730* -84.488 -26.279 -115.432*** -224.483* 3.420 -31.517 -172.851**
(5.367) (112.085) (79.780) (31.773) (35.288) (114.922) (83.142) (21.648) (70.846)
C. Incentive (A-B) -12.266 -23.507 12.026 -19.733 -17.783 -4.669 1.583 8.659 -9.546
(9.058) (69.898) (60.538) (37.515) (25.293) (68.365) (61.423) (9.547) (30.724)
∆ 1,400 1,100 1,100 900 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,700 1,100
Obs. 581 453 453 373 453 453 453 699 453
LLR with optimal bandwidth for freshmen after 1993
A. Overall (TL=0) -1.700 -194.691** -90.123 -24.413 -63.510** -179.994* -82.126 -16.504 -79.816**
(9.959) (78.982) (79.762) (17.447) (28.892) (93.490) (81.686) (22.076) (37.335)
B. Composition (TL=1) -0.835 -211.854*** -78.857 -25.133 -80.898*** -186.958** -101.239 -18.277 -63.586**
(4.460) (70.767) (50.398) (22.939) (27.108) (72.858) (63.459) (22.740) (28.446)
C. Incentive (A-B) -0.865 17.163 -11.265 0.720 17.388 6.965 19.113 1.774 -16.230
(10.208) (66.743) (76.860) (19.341) (17.172) (79.944) (79.586) (10.525) (19.827)
∆ 1,200 1,500 1,400 1,400 1,500 1,400 1,400 1,000 1,600
Obs. 642 796 746 746 796 746 746 546 848
LLR with optimal bandwidth and covariates
A. Overall (TL=0) 0.536 -199.591*** -45.437 -28.794* -77.334*** -196.206*** 15.797 -32.314** -115.519**
(8.587) (66.429) (47.732) (15.433) (25.928) (66.489) (57.826) (15.059) (50.073)
B. Composition (TL=1) 3.807 -209.376*** -61.185 -26.179 -82.791*** -213.311*** -12.936 -37.828** -107.165*
(4.174) (80.066) (46.896) (22.029) (22.540) (81.733) (49.636) (15.502) (56.004)
C. Incentive (A-B) -3.748 12.467 17.819 -3.644 8.709 20.158 29.396 5.988 -4.481
(8.519) (51.965) (50.096) (18.866) (15.347) (50.596) (63.158) (8.120) (21.762)
∆ 1,200 1,000 1,500 1,100 1,500 1,000 1,400 1,400 1,100
Obs. 816 696 1,016 758 1,016 696 950 950 624
Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on budget variables. Terms from 1993 to 2001; only mayors observed for two terms, with binding term limit in the second.
Estimates computed with Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equation (8); the optimal symmetric bandwidth ∆ is chosen with cross-validation methods. First robustness exercise:
invariant town characteristics (Area in km2 and North/South dummy) as additional covariates. Second robustness exercise: sample restricted to mayors elected in contestable cities (i.e.,
with less than 55% of votes). Third robustness exercise: sample restricted to mayors elected for the ﬁrst time after the 1993 reform. All variables are in per-capita terms, expressed in
euros at 2000 prices, and averaged over the mayoral term (election years excluded). TL is an index for the term limit. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.Table 13: Budget components per capita, placebo tests
Deﬁcit Expenditure Revenues
Total Investments Personnel Goods and Total Transfers Taxes Tariﬀs
and debt services
Split polynomial approximation, median above (5,932)
A. Overall (TL=0) 7.811 -160.051 -13.825 -21.167 -125.059 -167.863 -68.058 -74.455 -25.350
(20.463) (228.821) (172.845) (69.780) (112.814) (228.685) (207.084) (68.814) (83.342)
B. Composition (TL=1) 11.548 -202.258 -4.351 -51.835 -146.071 -213.806 -85.559 -69.829 -58.418
(12.891) (209.127) (99.392) (74.894) (92.317) (212.713) (159.264) (73.544) (68.603)
C. Incentive (A-B) -3.736 42.206 -9.474 30.668 21.012 45.943 17.501 -4.626 33.068
(19.959) (193.491) (177.979) (54.873) (51.187) (194.461) (180.855) (38.430) (49.339)
Obs. 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330
Split polynomial approximation, median below (3,980)
A. Overall (TL=0) 17.094 149.264 146.787 44.621 -42.143 132.171 155.785 -39.932 16.317
(12.782) (134.936) (100.112) (36.201) (44.314) (133.390) (125.144) (43.435) (46.820)
B. Composition (TL=1) 14.451 160.805 137.912 53.988 -31.094 146.354 180.280 -19.131 -14.795
(8.936) (170.995) (131.895) (52.807) (45.590) (170.626) (170.028) (45.516) (32.712)
C. Incentive (A-B) -3.154 -122.480 -90.121 -22.168 -10.191 -119.325 -122.282 -21.435 24.393
(13.711) (189.823) (184.674) (34.055) (32.993) (187.495) (187.477) (16.081) (27.119)
Obs. 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
Notes. Estimated discontinuities in budget components at fake thresholds (i.e, median above and below the true 5,000 threshold). Terms from 1993 to 2001; only mayors observed
for two terms, with binding term limit in the second. Estimates computed with a 3rd order polynomial approximation on either side of the threshold as in equation (9). All
variables are in per-capita terms, expressed in euros at 2000 prices, and averaged over the mayoral term (election years excluded). TL is an index for the term limit. Standard
errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.Table 14: Eﬃciency measures, RDD estimates
Speed of Speed of
collection payments
LLR with optimal bandwidth
A. Overall (TL=0) 4.534* 1.636*
(2.482) (0.923)
B. Composition (TL=1) 0.933 0.948
(2.742) (1.011)




LLR with half optimal bandwidth
A. Overall (TL=0) 5.565* 0.989
(3.217) (1.253)
B. Composition (TL=1) -1.472 1.256
(4.378) (1.479)





A. Overall (TL=0) 6.207* 0.986
(3.279) (1.661)
B. Composition (TL=1) -1.604 0.747
(4.169) (1.987)
C. Incentive (A-B) 7.811 0.238
(5.002) (1.819)
Obs. 1,194 1,194
Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on eﬃciency measures.
Terms from 1993 to 2001; only mayors observed for two terms, with binding term
limit in the second. First estimate: Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equation (8);
the optimal symmetric bandwidth ∆ is chosen with cross-validation methods. Second
estimate: LLR with half optimal bandwidth. Third estimate: 3rd order polynomial ap-
proximation on either side of the threshold as in equation (9); the maximum symmetric
bandwidth is 1,750. The Eﬃciency measures are expressed in percentage points: Speed
of collection is the ratio between collected and assessed revenues; Speed of payment is
the ratio between paid and committed outlays for public expenditure. TL is an index
for the term limit. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
42Table 15: Eﬃciency measures, robustness exercises
Speed of Speed of
collection payments
LLR with optimal bandwidth
for contestable cities
A. Overall (TL=0) 3.963 1.076
(2.639) (1.164)
B. Composition (TL=1) 1.545 0.662
(2.506) (1.279)




LLR with optimal bandwidth
for freshmen after 1993
A. Overall (TL=0) 4.882 1.338
(3.072) (1.115)
B. Composition (TL=1) 1.086 1.284
(3.117) (1.301)




LLR with optimal bandwidth
and covariates
A. Overall (TL=0) 4.756* 1.423
(2.468) (0.899)
B. Composition (TL=1) 0.869 0.657
(2.603) (1.021)




Notes. Eﬀect of the 33% wage increase at the 5,000 threshold on eﬃciency measures.
Terms from 1993 to 2001; only mayors observed for two terms, with binding term limit
in the second. Estimates computed with Local Linear Regression (LLR) as in equa-
tion (8); the optimal symmetric bandwidth ∆ is chosen with cross-validation methods.
First robustness exercise: invariant town characteristics (Area in km2 and North/South
dummy) as additionalcovariates. Secondrobustnessexercise: sample restrictedto may-
ors elected in contestable cities (i.e., with less than 55% of votes). Third robustness
exercise: sample restricted to mayors elected for the ﬁrst time after the 1993 reform.
The Eﬃciency measures are expressed in percentage points: Speed of collection is the
ratio between collected and assessed revenues; Speed of payment is the ratio between
paid and committed outlays for public expenditure. TL is an index for the term limit.
Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses. Sig-
niﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***.
43Table 16: Eﬃciency measures, placebo tests




A. Overall (TL=0) 2.208 4.102
(5.098) (3.425)
B. Composition (TL=1) -0.823 0.827
(7.891) (3.656)





A. Overall (TL=0) 1.589 -1.507
(5.313) (2.076)
B. Composition (TL=1) -3.825 -2.125
(3.661) (2.181)
C. Incentive (A-B) 4.068 0.042
(6.203) (2.187)
Obs. 666 666
Notes. Estimated discontinuities in eﬃciency measures at fake thresholds (i.e, median
above and below the true 5,000 threshold). Terms from 1993 to 2001; only mayors
observed for two terms, with binding term limit in the second. Estimates computed
with a 3rd order polynomialapproximationon either side of the thresholdas in equation
(9). The Eﬃciency measures are expressed in percentage points: Speed of collection
is the ratio between collected and assessed revenues; Speed of payment is the ratio
between paid and committed outlaysfor publicexpenditure. TL is an index for the term
limit. Standard errors robust to clustering at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***.


















Notes. Frequency of cities according to populationin the 2001 Census. Cities
below 20,000 inhabitants only. Vertical lines identify policy thresholds.















population size − 2001 Census
bin=200 bin=100
bin=50
Notes. Frequencyof citiesaroundthe 5,000threshold(verticalline), according
to population size in the 2001 Census.

















3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density (according to the 2001
Census), performed separately on either side of the 5,000 threshold. Optimal
binwidth and binsize as in McCrary (2008).
































































































































































Notes. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing of the variable on the
vertical axis (with a bandwidth of 1), performed separately on either side of
the 5,000 threshold. The dash line is a ﬁtted regressionover the whole sample.
The dots are the observed values averaged in intervals of 50 inhabitants.

















































































































































Notes. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing of the variable on the
vertical axis (with a bandwidth of 1), performed separately on either side of
the 5,000 threshold. The dash line is a ﬁtted regressionover the whole sample.
The dots are the observed values averaged in intervals of 50 inhabitants.


















































































































































































































Notes. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing of the variable on the
vertical axis (with a bandwidth of 1), performed separately on either side of
the 5,000 threshold. The dash line is a ﬁtted regressionover the whole sample.
The dots are the observed values averaged in intervals of 50 inhabitants.






















































Notes. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing of the variable on the
vertical axis (with a bandwidth of 1), performed separately on either side of
the 5,000 threshold. The dash line is a ﬁtted regressionover the whole sample.
The dots are the observed values averaged in intervals of 50 inhabitants.
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